

Jan De Graaf

The Golden Age and its Malcontents

Continental Socialists and Social Democrats Facing the British and Scandinavian Models

In January 1959, the National Council of the French Socialist Party (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* – SFIO) came together to discuss yet another election defeat. Ever since taking 24 per cent of the popular vote in the wake of the Second World War, the SFIO had been on a steady slide – leaving the party with just 14 per cent of the vote and less than a tenth of parliamentary seats after the November 1958 legislative elections. According to Augustin Laurent, the Secretary of the SFIO's powerful Northern Federation, it was high time for French socialism to start drawing “the necessary lessons” from the “revolutionary reformism” that was being put into practice by the Swedish Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti* – SAP). To do so, the SFIO had to muster the courage to critically review some of its own core tenets. After all, during the election campaign, Laurent had received many letters from potential socialist voters who were put off by the radical axioms that were still at the heart of the SFIO constitution:

“Those people wrote: ‘I am inclined to vote socialist [...], as this or that action of the party, at any given moment in the history of our country, had my support. But would you care to explain what is meant by Article 1 of your statute book: ‘The Socialist Party aims to win political power to transform capitalist society into a collectivist or communist society?’”

Jan De Graaf, History Department, KU Leuven, Blijde-Inkomststraat 21, 3000 Leuven, Belgium, jan.degraaf@kuleuven.be

Certainly, he continued, socialist activists and leaders were well aware of the finer nuances that went behind this principle. That was certainly not the case, however, amongst the electorate as a whole. For many people, noted Laurent, “socialism equals communism”, as “radio reports speak of ‘socialist countries’, ‘the socialist camp’, [or] ‘victories of socialism’ every day”. Should the SFIO keep failing to undertake “the indispensable effort of clarification”, therefore, “we will distance ourselves from, and lose any influence over, those men and women who only want to serve a great cause”.¹

If these observations sound familiar, it is because they reflect conventional wisdom on the post-war European socialist and social democratic parties very well. In fact, the historiography of (post-war) European socialism has often taken an explicitly idealist and teleological approach in which the attitudes and experiences of the most successful parties of the international socialist movement are held up as a model to follow. For much of the early history of European socialism, that model was provided by the German Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* – SPD), which had been the strongest party by far within the pre-war Second International and would become the first socialist party to lead a government in a major country after the First World War. As the star of the SPD waned decidedly during the nadir of the Weimar Republic, however, the focal point of the European socialist movement shifted northwards. With the German social democrats driven into exile after 1933, the British Labour Party had gradually come to replace the SPD as the leading force in the interwar Labour and Socialist International.² In Scandinavia, meanwhile, the Swedish and Norwegian social democrats had started to dominate coalition governments from the early 1930s onwards by embracing a parliamentary road to socialism and implementing an expansionist economic policy in the face of the Great Depression.³

The British Labour Party and the Scandinavian social democratic parties would cement their leading role within the international socialist movement during the first post-war decades. These decades have entered history books as “the golden age of social democracy”,⁴ as many of the social and economic reforms that socialists and social democrats had historically fought for were finally implemented. The golden age found its embodiment in the policies pursued by governments under the leadership of the British socialists and Scandinavian social democrats. After its landslide victory in the United Kingdom General Election of 1945, the Labour Party put in place a universal welfare state that promised to look after its citizens from the cradle to the grave.⁵ The Scandinavian social democratic parties, for their part, set about to create a “capitalism with a human face” through the introduction of a Keynesian demand management aimed at achieving full employment.⁶

Historians have frequently attributed the post-war successes of Labour and the Scandinavian social democratic parties to the concordance between their moder-

ate programmes and their reformist practice. For these were parties that had by and large abandoned any revolutionary aspirations and set their sights firmly on achieving piecemeal reforms within existing political and socio-economic structures. The Labour Party, as its post-war Secretary Morgan Phillips famously put it, “owed more to Methodism than to Marx”.⁷ The Scandinavian social democratic parties had likewise dropped all Marxist phraseology from their programmes by 1945.⁸ In doing so, Labour and the Scandinavian social democratic parties managed to transform themselves into catch-all people’s parties. With programmes perfectly tailored to an electorate that wanted the state to take a greater role in economic life, but backed away from the socio-political radicalism that had been so widespread during the interwar years, these parties consistently polled above 40 per cent of the vote and were in a position to govern on their own.

Historians have often attributed the fact that the socialist and social democratic parties on the European continent by and large failed to replicate these successes to their reluctance to take up the teachings of the British or Nordic models. Even though the continental socialist parties had *de facto* also been practising reformist politics for quite some time, in rhetorical terms, these parties remained wedded to radical slogans and a revolutionary symbolism. Their programmes made due references to Marxist notions of class struggle and still defined the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism as the ultimate socialist objective. It was this mismatch between ideology and praxis that much bewildered and eventually drove away voters in the political centre, reducing many continental socialist parties to junior partnerships in coalition governments or even to opposition.

In her well-known and widely-cited history of twentieth-century European socialism, Sheri Berman castigates the post-war continental socialist parties for their continued adherence to an outdated and doctrinaire theoretical framework that was detached from reality. For unlike the Swedish social democrats, “who actually understood and believed in what they were doing”, the leaders of the continental socialist parties “still didn’t hear the music and continued to proclaim their dedication to classic pre-war ideological goals such as transcending capitalism entirely”. By the time they came to realise that this was “a disastrous political strategy”, the damage had been done as “other actors had gotten a jump on them politically, and the true lineage of the new arrangements had been forgotten”.⁹

Dietrich Orlow similarly traces many of the problems of the post-war continental socialist parties back to the ideological baggage they carried over from the pre-war years. Orlow published his comparative history of the post-war Dutch, French, and German socialist and social democratic parties during the heyday of the New Labour government in Great Britain. The successes of the Labour Party often appear to serve as an unspoken template in his work. For where Labour had never been a

Marxist party to begin with, he explains, the post-war histories of the three parties that he explores were still characterised by the struggles with the “vestiges of a Marxist teleology”. Out of the three, the Dutch Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid – PvdA*), which modelled itself closely on its British namesake (see below), certainly shed these vestiges the fastest, and its “pragmatic reformism” is compared favourably to the more “defensive” attitudes taken by the SPD and the “diehard socialism” (*socialisme pur et dur*) of the SFIO.¹⁰

In fact, the socialist and social democratic parties from the three largest countries in mainland Europe are often singled out for particular criticism in such accounts. Under the post-war leadership of Kurt Schumacher, the (West) German SPD stubbornly refused to renew its platform. The Heidelberg programme of 1925, which had strongly re-committed the SPD to Marxist orthodoxy after a bruising period in government,¹¹ thus remained in place – leaving the party vulnerable to the well-known line of attack that “all roads of Marxism lead to Moscow”.¹² It was only after Schumacher’s death, and a series of election defeats, that the SPD finally jettisoned Marxism and embraced reformism in its Bad Godesberg programme of 1959.¹³

Within the post-war SFIO, a group of reformers around interwar Prime Minister Léon Blum did try to reach out to centrist voters. They suggested that the Marxist concepts of “the proletariat” and “class struggle” should be scrapped from the party’s declaration of principles, to be replaced by the more innocuous notions of “working people” and “class action” respectively.¹⁴ But these proposals were rejected by party activists and, at the August 1946 congress of the SFIO, Guy Mollet took over as party Secretary on a promise to take French socialism back to its Marxist roots.¹⁵ Over the decades that followed, Mollet would strengthen his grip on the SFIO as the party stumbled from one election defeat to the next – until it made way for the more broad-based Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste – PS*) in 1969.

The post-war Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano – PSI*) has offered historians perhaps the most striking example of a socialist party that was completely out of step with its time. For the PSI did not merely espouse a most doctrinaire vision of Marxism until the mid-1970s, it was also the only major socialist party in Western Europe that upheld its alliance with the communists as the Cold War took off. As a consequence, the PSI saw its right wing break away in January 1947 and was removed from the international socialist movement the next year. Even after the socialists abandoned their unity pact with the communists in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the PSI kept struggling for relevance between the established communist and Catholic power blocs. Unable to truly make its mark on national government until the 1980s, therefore, the PSI has frequently been described as an anomaly in the otherwise more governmental history of post-war European social democracy.¹⁶

This article aims to challenge the teleological historiographical perspective that measures the post-war continental socialist and social democratic parties (almost) exclusively by the extent to which they managed to emulate their electorally more successful sister parties in Britain or Scandinavia. Unlike so much work on post-war socialism, its approach is not rooted in the history of ideas, but rather in social and political history. By reconstructing the debates between the post-war European socialist and social democratic parties, the article will demonstrate that there were significant societal and institutional barriers to following the British or Scandinavian templates in continental Europe. In doing so, it calls into question the widespread historiographical notion that “the Swedish road to socialism [...] became a model for many Social Democrats in Western Europe”.¹⁷ That is of course not to argue that the continental socialists never expressed their admiration for or even envy of the achievements of their comrades in Britain and Scandinavia. It was just that many of them did not believe that the teachings of the Labour or Nordic models were applicable to their countries. In fact, the continental socialist parties were far more likely to draw their inspiration from the experiences, for better or for worse, of their sister organisations on the European mainland.

During the first post-war years, that included the socialist and social democratic parties from Eastern Europe. Their involvement with the international socialist movement was short-lived, as these parties had all been forced into mergers with the communists by 1948, and historians have long dismissed or neglected their contribution to the debates at the first post-war international socialist conferences. For the Eastern European socialist parties were supposedly “nothing but front organizations of the Communists”¹⁸ that found themselves under “remote control” from Moscow.¹⁹ But more recent work actually drawing on primary research in (reopened) Eastern European archives has stressed that the socialists and social democrats from behind the Iron Curtain actually steered an increasingly independent course vis-à-vis both the communists and the Soviet Union.²⁰ That means we have to take the arguments they put forward seriously. In fact, as I have explained in far greater detail elsewhere, we cannot properly understand the post-war history of some Western European socialist parties (especially the PSI) without adding the experiences of their Eastern European sister parties to the equation.²¹

The article constructs its narrative around three periods during which the socialist debate over templates to follow and the very nature of socialism intensified. The first is the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. In this initial period, the achievements of the British Labour Party, on the back of its landslide victory in the 1945 parliamentary elections, attracted a great deal of socialist attention. Right from the outset, however, the Italian PSI and most of the Eastern European parties rejected the teachings of the British model for their countries. Those continental parties that

tried to model themselves on the Labour Party, moreover, quickly found that what was a winning formula in Britain was not necessarily a winning formula in continental Europe. The second period is the early 1950s. By this time, the Eastern European parties and the PSI, which had refused to abandon its domestic alliance with the communists as the Cold War began, had been removed from the international socialist movement. If this narrowed the debate, the remaining parties certainly did not see eye to eye on fundamental questions of doctrine and approach. The discussions surrounding the re-establishment of the Socialist International, which eventually came into being in 1951, once more highlighted the divides between the British and Scandinavian parties on the one side and the major continental parties on the other. The third period is the late 1950s. At a moment when many continental parties were reconsidering their core tenets, the Socialist International revisited its attitudes towards some key Marxist notions. Compared to its earlier rounds, the debate took place in a friendlier and more consensual atmosphere this time around. This was linked to the social and political convergence between continental Europe and Britain and Scandinavia that had taken place since the end of the war. Yet, it was also the result of an attitudinal change, as most parties now accepted that the road to socialism could not be dictated by universal models, but had to have its roots in the political history and social structure of individual countries.

In the Footsteps of Labour

It is almost impossible to overstate the prestige that Labour enjoyed amongst its sister parties in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Here was a party that had stood firm in the face of the fascist onslaught and had proven itself in the wartime coalition government, to be rewarded by the electorate with a large parliamentary majority. Its 48 per cent vote share, moreover, showed that the appeal of the Labour Party stretched far beyond the industrial working class. Small wonder, then, that quite a few socialists and social democrats on the European continent looked to emulate Labour as they started rebuilding their parties. In post-war Austria, the Labour Party was so popular that it actually served as a model for both the Austrian Socialist Party (*Sozialistische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ*) and its main Catholic rival.²² The Dutch social democrats, meanwhile, renamed their party the Dutch Labour Party and explicitly referred to Labour's successes on their campaign material.²³ And within and around the SFIO, there was all sorts of talk of forming a *parti travailliste* that would attract the lower middle classes and Catholics alongside industrial workers.²⁴

Even during Labour's honeymoon period, however, there was a number of continental parties that would not readily embrace the teachings of the British road to socialism. It was not so much that these parties, including the PSI, the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* – PPS), and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (*Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Part* – MSZDP), disapproved of what Labour was doing in Britain. Yet they strongly believed their parties and countries faced altogether different challenges. Socialist and social democratic leaders from these countries insisted they could not follow the gradualist and reformist path taken by Labour for two interconnected reasons. In the first place, the absence of longer democratic traditions in their countries forced them to adopt a more revolutionary line. For if Britain was a mature democracy, where political opponents could be expected to play by the democratic rulebook, this was most decidedly not the case in their countries. This was what Emanuel Buchinger, the MSZDP veteran who had been on the Executive of the interwar Labour and Socialist International, tried to impart to his old comrades when he addressed the SPD congress in the summer of 1947:

We want to build a democracy in Hungary. But this cannot be a democracy similar to that in Britain, which has developed over the course of centuries. For if the Labour government were to be defeated in the next elections, that would at worst result in a delay of the socialist transformation of Britain. If the old reactionary classes were to rise to power again in Hungary, however, there would not be enough trees in Bakony forest for the counter-revolutionary regime to hang all true democrats and socialist workers. [...] Our country has never known freedom under Habsburg rule. [And] it was poisoned by the reactionary spirit of the Horthy dictatorship [the right-wing authoritarian regime that had governed Hungary with an iron fist from 1920 to 1944 – JG] which dominated it for a quarter of a century.²⁵

If the Polish socialists repeatedly rejected the British model on similar grounds, the issue was more contentious within the PSI. Giuseppe Saragat and his followers on the right of Italian socialism, who would break away from the PSI in early 1947, did hold up the British road to socialism as a template to follow in the increasingly bitter debates that preceded the split. But Sandro Pertini, who briefly served as PSI Secretary after the war and would go on to become the first socialist President of Italy in the 1970s, expressed the majority viewpoint when he retorted that “an educated man” like Saragat should know better than to conflate “the objective Italian situation” with that “in Britain and some other countries”. For contrary to Saragat's claims that the Labour landslide showed that there was “no longer a danger of a violent return of reaction”, the reality was “that we are emerging from a dictatorship

imposed by violence, that Germany is emerging from a dictatorship imposed by violence, and that a dictatorship imposed by violence still exists in Spain”²⁶

This scepticism over the pertinence of the British experience to continental Europe had its roots not only in the unhappy political history of various countries on the European mainland, but also in their broader social make-up. The MSZDP, PPS, and PSI would frequently contrast the advanced industrial economies of Britain and Scandinavia with their underdeveloped rural societies. Faced with large majorities of backward and illiterate peasants, these parties insisted that they could not rely on the same methods as their comrades in North-Western Europe.

Lelio Basso, who was PSI Secretary during the fateful years of 1947 and 1948, noted that the Italian socialists were more than willing to admit that “Labourism [...] is the method of action suited to the British proletariat”. In the Scandinavian countries, too, “a democratic tradition has taken root, [...] the working class has long since acquired relatively high living standards, and, as a consequence of that economic elevation, an appropriate political maturity”. Most of Eastern Europe, by contrast, was “underdeveloped industrially”, which found its reflection in both “a numerically scarce and profoundly immature middle class” and “a large mass of ignorant and often illiterate peasants, who are easily misled by priests and reactionaries”. In these circumstances, adhering to the gradualist and strictly parliamentary methods used by Labour and the Scandinavian social democratic parties would “keep the old plutocratic classes in power indefinitely [and] postpone for centuries not only the realisation of socialism, but even the improvement of the moral and material living conditions of the proletariat, especially of rural labourers”. It would therefore be “anti-historical and reactionary”, argued Basso, “to pretend that it is possible to apply to Poland methods that are specific to Britain or to apply to Britain methods that are specific to Poland”.²⁷

These observations were made against the backdrop of what Basso described as “the failure” of the International Socialist Conference in Clacton-on-Sea (Britain). At this conference, organised and hosted by the Labour Party in May 1946, delegations from most major European socialist and social democratic parties had met for the first time since the war (the one exception being the SPD, which was only readmitted to the international socialist movement in December 1947). The objectives of the conference were limited, with information exchange defined as the chief aim. In this context, the Hungarian, Italian, and Polish delegations, this time also backed by the Romanian representative, once more pointed to the peculiar political situation in their countries. According to the PSI delegate, there was “a strong reactionary movement” in post-war Italy, whilst its Christian Democratic Party (i.e. the party, under the leadership of Alcide De Gasperi, that would come to dominate Italian politics during the Cold War) was “neither Christian nor democratic”. The MSZDP

delegate, for his part, raised the “strong Conservative and landed interests” in his country and insisted that “the majority of the [Hungarian] population is anti-democratic”. And the PPS delegate stressed that “our Polish democracy must have different weapons to protect herself than British democracy”.²⁸

Yet, these viewpoints, coupled as they were to a call for socialist and communist parties to present a united front, could count on little sympathy amongst socialists and social democrats from more advanced and industrialised democracies. Especially the Eastern European parties, therefore, left Clacton-on-Sea with a distinct feeling that their problems were not being taken seriously or even played down by their comrades in Northern and Western Europe. Reporting back to his party’s Central Executive Committee, PPS Secretary Josef Cyrankiewicz noted that “personal attacks” had appeared “even in the leftist *Tribune* [the British socialist magazine, which was close to the left wing of the Labour Party in both personnel and ideological terms – JG]”, whereas “the tone of the accounts’ of some sister parties had revealed feelings of ‘superiority’”.²⁹

For at the Clacton-on-Sea conference, the British and, to a lesser extent, Scandinavian models had still very much ruled the day within the international socialist movement. The representatives of the Labour Party, the Swedish SAP, and the Norwegian Labour Party (*Det Norske Arbeiderparti* – DNA) boasted about what governments run by their parties had managed to achieve in the social and economic realms. Their reports exuded confidence in the future. The SAP delegate was particularly bullish that, even after “[w]e have had a Labour Government for 14 years in Sweden”, it would take a “very long time before the combined bourgeois parties could take over the government”.³⁰

He was not mistaken. Tage Erlander, who became SAP leader and Prime Minister in 1946, remained in office for a stunning 23 years and the Swedish social democrats would not find themselves in opposition until 1976. The social democratic parties in post-war Denmark and Norway similarly went from strength to strength and dominated governments for decades. And even though Labour lost power after the 1951 elections, it did so having won an even higher vote share than in 1945 and having profoundly changed the debate in Britain – with the Conservatives adopting large parts of Labour’s socio-economic programme. What Labour and the Scandinavian social democrats were doing, then, was clearly working very well in their respective countries.

By the time of the Clacton-on-Sea conference, however, it was already becoming clear that these successes were not readily replicated on the European continent. For even those socialist and social democratic parties that had explicitly modelled themselves on Labour had been quite unable to reap similar rewards at the polls. For the time being, however, most of these parties remained fixated on the British

road to socialism and attributed their electoral setbacks to political circumstance rather than social structure. The Dutch PvdA blamed its disappointing showing in the April 1946 parliamentary elections, in which the social democrats had actually gone backwards compared to their combined result in the last elections prior to the war, on a lack of preparedness. The elections had come “too early”, lamented the Dutch delegate, “as our electoral machine was not organised”.

The Austrian socialists, thanks in no small part to the fact that the Allied occupiers of their country had allowed no more than three parties to (re-) establish themselves after the war, did poll a respectable 45 per cent of the vote in the November 1945 parliamentary elections. But this still left the SPÖ five percentage points behind their Catholic rivals, who won an outright parliamentary majority. According to the Austrian delegate at Clacton-on-Sea, this was due chiefly to the SPÖ’s temporary weakness in its former bastion of “Red Vienna”. With many men still displaced, he explained, women made up 69 per cent of the population of Vienna. The parliamentary majority for the Catholics, accordingly, had been “imposed by the women”.³¹

The sort of prejudice that was implicit here – that women stood under the influence of priests and clergy and would therefore not vote for socialists – had deep roots in European socialism, especially amongst socialist parties from Catholic countries.³² In fact, in offering this particular analysis for their electoral woes, the Austrian socialists had more in common with the PSI, with Basso also designating the “political illiteracy” of women as one of the principal problems facing the Italian left,³³ than with Labour. Confident that things would take a turn for the better “as men come back”, however, the SPÖ kept mirroring its British sister party, only to lose ground in the parliamentary elections of October 1949.³⁴

Not all of the parties that had initially been mesmerized by Labour’s successes, however, remained as enthusiastic about the spiritual guidance that their British comrades were providing. At Clacton-on-Sea, the Belgian delegate made it quite clear that his party “did not think it was good” that the international socialist movement “should seem to be inspired solely by the Labour Party” and he “therefore wished to see more contact between the Labour Party and the French Socialist Party”. The French socialists, for their part, had tried to fight the October 1945 parliamentary elections on a Labourite platform, by running on a common list with the centrist Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance. After finishing a disappointing third, behind both the communists and the Christian democrats, doubts about this strategy of reaching out to non-proletarian constituencies were already creeping in. In a sign of things to come under Mollet’s leadership, the French delegate at Clacton-on-Sea argued that “we must not forget the role of our party in the great working masses, where communism predominates”.³⁵

The Cradle of the International

The expulsion of the PSI and the Eastern European parties from the international socialist movement, which came to pass after these parties had condoned the February 1948 communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, closed down one road to socialism. From 1948 onwards, a strong commitment to democracy and a commensurate renunciation of communism became a pre-requisite for membership within the international socialist movement. That did not mean, however, that there were no longer any significant ideological or doctrinal divides between the European socialists and social democrats. For even if the Socialist International would eventually be reconstituted in 1951, its member parties were by no means in agreement over the proper template for socialists to follow.

The debate about re-establishing the Socialist International only began in earnest following the split of 1948. The Belgian and French socialists, who were pinning for the prestige of the old International, had been calling for the organisation to be reconstituted since the end of the war. But the Labour Party, which did not want its government to be constrained or embarrassed by the decisions of an international organisation, had always insisted that the Eastern European parties could, for domestic reasons, never be part of an International that would numerically be dominated by the Western European socialists and social democrats. As this argument had of course become obsolete after 1948, pressure on Labour to at least discuss the rebuilding of the Socialist International had been building ever since. At the repeated request of the SFIO, therefore, Guy Mollet was tasked with canvassing whether the various parties that made up the international socialist movement could find common ground on the foundations of democratic socialism.

Mollet presented his findings, based on the reports that most European member parties had sent in, at the International Socialist Conference in Copenhagen of June 1950. In his statement, he did his utmost to brush over the significant differences between the parties by suggesting that the majority backed the French position. This became obvious in the very first question that he addressed: that of socialism's objectives. In this regard, he explained, the Scandinavian parties clearly stressed the political and moral aspects of socialism over its social and economic dimensions. After all, the joint report that the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish social democratic parties had submitted, identified freedom and peace as the foremost aims of socialism. In its economic section, moreover, their report had not even mentioned capitalism, but instead called for "a progressive change in the economic conditions in order to ensure for all a decent standard of living and a just share of the benefits resulting from production".³⁶

But according to Mollet, the Scandinavian parties found themselves isolated in this respect, as all other reports had defined “the abolition of capitalism” as a precondition for “the good that socialists want to achieve for humanity”. In reality, however, there was a clear divide between the bland platitudes in the reports prepared by the Labour Party and the Dutch PvdA, noting respectively that the economy should be made to work “not for the profit of a class of capitalists but for the common good of the whole people” and that capitalism and communism should be rejected simultaneously, and the full-blown repudiation of capitalism that was advocated by their sister organisations further South. Especially the report of the Italian Social Democratic Party (*Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano* – PSDI), i.e. the secessionist party led by Giuseppe Saragat that had become the official Italian representative in the international socialist movement after the expulsion of the PSI, sounded like an implicit attack on the reformism that the Scandinavian social democratic parties were putting into practice. For the report insisted that socialists should not only “fight the excesses and inadequacies of the capitalist system, but the capitalist system itself and the social, cultural and moral laws based on that system”.³⁷

Still more controversial than the conundrum around socialist aims, however, was the question of socialist attitudes towards Marxism. Here too, the positions of the PvdA and the Labour Party were closely aligned. The Dutch report declared that “two world wars separate us from Marx” and that a new International should “make room for those who feel nearer to [Jean] Jaurès [the French socialist leader, who had led the reformist wing of the SFIO during the first decades of the twentieth century] and Thomas Masaryk [the father of the Czech nation and long-time leader of a non-Marxist socialist party]”. The British report, for its part, insisted that “Socialism in Great Britain was never influenced by Marxism but was born out of the utilitarian radicalism of [John] Stuart Mill, the Fabian school of Sidney Webb and Bernard Shaw, and the influence of the social reformers of the Anglican Church”. But, as far as Mollet was concerned, it seemed as though “our British friends are more afraid of the concept of Marxism than its practical application”. For “their daily action”, he explained, demonstrated that “they are continually influenced by Marxist conceptions”. If this already sounded like a thinly veiled attempt to associate British with French socialism, Mollet also put a very particular twist on the separate report that the SAP sent in to claim that the Swedish social democrats had always “been greatly influenced by Marxist thought”.³⁸

It is not surprising, therefore, that especially the British and Scandinavian parties wanted to set the record straight in the debate that followed Mollet’s statement. Morgan Phillips complained that, “[t]hough the British Labour Party is widely known and much discussed, the main source of its inspiration and its broad ethical appeal is not understood by many of our comrades in other countries”. He pointed out that

British socialism, in both theory and praxis, owed little to Marxism. In fact, continued Phillips, “Trotsky was not far wrong when he said that the English revolution [...] was nourished on Biblical texts, the French Revolution on the abstractions of democracy and the Russian Revolution on Marxism”. What followed was a long account in which Phillips rejected Marx’s teachings and stressed the profound influence that religious thought had exercised on the British labour movement. “The essential point”, he concluded, “is that Marxism as a philosophy of materialism, as an economic theory, and as a form of political organisation with revolutionary intention and aim, is historically an aberrant tendency in the development of British socialism”.³⁹

For the SAP, Tage Erlander similarly undertook to address “the misunderstandings” that had arisen about Swedish social democracy. The first of these was that the SAP, in its efforts to reach out to middle-class constituencies, had lost its proletarian character. According to Erlander, the SAP was “an outspoken workers’ party” that collaborated closely with the trade unions and had once more won the support of the working class in the recent elections. Yet, he argued, the changing social structure of their country presented the Swedish social democrats with a distinct problem. As the middle classes, especially the salaried groups, were growing relative to the working class, it was getting more difficult “to retain our strength and our parliamentary majority”. For that reason, it was imperative “for Socialists to increase their influence among these groups”.⁴⁰

Alsing Andersen, the former leader of the Danish Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiet* – SD) and future President of the Socialist International, associated himself with Erlander’s remarks. He also had a strong message for those parties that wanted to define a general theoretical framework for European socialism. As “conditions in various countries vary very much”, he warned, “[w]e should not have a theory which cannot be applied to all countries”. For “[i]f our basic ideas are shown not to fit into real life, we must change them and not dogmatically cling to them”. This was especially true for notions of class struggle. Whilst Andersen accepted the existence of class struggle, “this idea is not a spell which ensures our political advance”. Quite the contrary, “[w]e cannot [...] rally the farmers, not even the small farmers, with a call to fight the class struggle”. Statistics had proven, noted Andersen, that, “in our modern society”, the ranks of “the so-called middle classes” were growing at a much faster rate than those of manual labourers. It was up to socialist and social democratic parties to tailor their message accordingly: “These people belong to us. We must learn to talk to them in a way they can understand”.⁴¹

But if Britain and the Scandinavian countries may have become ‘modern societies’ in which the middle classes made up a significant and growing part of the population, this was not yet the case in most of continental Europe. For many continen-

tal parties, therefore, the theories that seemed so outdated and irrelevant to their North-Western sister parties had retained their validity. In the name of the Italian social democrats, Angelica Balabanoff, the erstwhile Secretary of the Comintern who had grown disillusioned with communism and eventually joined the PSDI, vigorously defended Marxism. In her view, the misgivings that various parties had expressed about Marxist ideas and concepts stemmed from “a psychological problem”, caused by the defeats that the working class had suffered. She acknowledged it was “true that the policies adopted by Marxist parties have failed us, but we should not confuse politics with the method”. The Marxist method, she insisted, “still holds good” and should be drawn upon by socialists “in order to work out our policies”. Turning herself directly towards Phillips, she asked: “[W]here is the contradiction between Labour Britain and the Marxist method?” For the Labour delegate who had addressed the most recent PSDI congress clearly “understood the Marxist method” when he explained that the “fundamental change” that had taken place under the Labour government was that “[t]he poor eat more and the rich eat less”. According to Balabanoff, therefore, the discussions on the re-establishment of the Socialist International were to result in the development of “a theoretical method which gives the workers a conception of their historical role”.⁴²

There was no way that the most powerful of parties of the international socialist movement were going to countenance a new Socialist International based on Marxist principles, however. In fact, within the commission that was appointed at Copenhagen to put together a declaration of principles for the Socialist International, the important positions were monopolised by parties that rejected a revolutionary phraseology. It fell to the Labour Party to draft the preamble, to their close allies of the SPÖ to compose the chapter on political democracy, and to the SAP to draw up the chapter on economic democracy. This left the parties of Marxist inspiration with the less contentious chapters on social democracy and international democracy, which were assigned to the Swiss Socialist Party and the SFIO respectively.

The resulting declaration of principles, which was adopted at the June 1951 founding congress of the Socialist International in Frankfurt, reflected its authorship. It defined socialism primarily by what it was against, i.e. communism and fascism; it barely mentioned Marxism; and it formulated a most moderate economic programme.⁴³ Salomon Grumbach, the International Secretary of the SFIO who had chaired the drafting commission, could barely disguise his chagrin when he introduced the declaration. The declaration, he lamented, included “many imperfections” and was “lacking in intellectual substance“. After briefly discussing the merits of the declaration, he was more elaborate about what he considered its shortcomings. It had been the intention of the drafting commission, he explained, “to prepare a text in simple terms, easily understood by all”. The consequence was that “[t]he lan-

guage of the declaration is not that of passion and enthusiasm; it lacks the vigour of a bold vision; it does not appeal to our imagination and emotions". If its formulations reflected "the sincere endeavour of socialists to attain agreement", the declaration represented no more than the lowest common denominator of socialist thought as far as Grumbach was concerned: "In short, it is not a manifesto in the usual sense of the word. If you ask me whether it is comprehensive and clear enough as a guide to the future, whether it can claim permanence – or, rather, validity for decades to come – I say frankly 'no'".⁴⁴

This pessimism was certainly not shared by the Scandinavian social democrats. For the SD, Andersen warmly welcomed the declaration. He argued that the social and political situation in which the thirty-four parties affiliated to the Socialist International found themselves was so diverse that it was "impossible to draw up a detailed common programme". Nonetheless, the Danish social democrats were delighted at what the various parties had been "able to agree on so many points essential to democratic socialism". That the declaration whole-heartedly affirmed that "socialism and democracy are indeed inseparable" was of particular significance after "[t]he abuse of the socialist name by fascists and communists". The only criticism that the SD could level at the new International revolved around its name. "In accordance with tradition", explained Andersen, "the reconstituted International calls itself the *Socialist* International". Yet, its member parties "are not only socialist, they are also democratic". For that reason, the Socialist International was "in fact, a Social Democratic International and, in view of the suspicions so often thrown on our democratic honesty by our liberal and conservative opponents, it would [...] have been right and appropriate to adopt that name".⁴⁵

This just added insult to injury for the French delegation. Mollet expressed his surprise that Andersen felt that "our statement should cater for both democrats and socialists". For "[h]ave we not always believed that without socialism there can be no real democracy?". In any case, the declaration was "clear enough in this respect". Instead, Mollet reserved his censure for those sections of the declaration that were of Scandinavian inspiration. There were "omissions" in the chapter on economic democracy, he complained. More specifically, the declaration could have voiced "our will to abolish capitalism more definitely". As it stood, after all, the declaration contained "enough criticism [of], but not enough outright attack on capitalism. Nor have we adequately developed the sections dealing with the socialist system".⁴⁶

If the SFIO took exception to the ambiguities in the economic paragraphs of the declaration, the German social democrats felt that its political arguments were lacking in theoretical underpinning. Willi Eichler, the West German parliamentarian who represented the SPD in the debate, pointed out that his party did not share "the fear of a theory, which some delegates seem to have". The formulation of a theoret-

ical framework for the Socialist International, he insisted, would allow its member parties “not only to agree on common foundations, but move forward in the same direction”. Of course, that would not involve “a Politburo to lay down the law” or “a sort of Papal Office to act as our supreme moral judge”. But a “scientific clarification” of what socialism entailed could have addressed some of the “weaknesses” in the declaration of principles. For if the declaration had “rejected totalitarianism in the form of fascism and communism”, argued Eichler, totalitarianism also existed “in a much older form – I mean the clericalism of the Roman Catholic Church”. Clericalism, he went on, “on principle rejects the idea that power should be vested in the people” and “has supported Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini”. Yet, there was “not a word in our declaration about this enemy of freedom”. According to Eichler, that had everything to do with the fact that the declaration of principles had been “animated by the spirit of empiricism which is especially strong in some countries, such as [in] Britain and Scandinavia”. And whilst he was the first to admit that “experience is a great teacher”, a more thorough theoretical model “might have enabled us to eliminate certain mistakes in our thinking before they caused very bitter and costly experiences”. One of these mistakes, which was left unresolved in the declaration of principles, was that the socialist position on democracy offered no guidance as to “the treatment of those forces in society which deny the validity of the democratic rules of procedure and have no intention of keeping to them”.⁴⁷

These remarks were of course intimately linked to recent German history. For unlike their British and Scandinavian counterparts, the German social democrats had ample experience with political opponents who refused to play by democratic rules. It was not just in this respect that the SPD echoed the line previously taken by the Italian and Eastern European socialists. Much like the leaders of the PSI and the Eastern parties had done prior to their expulsion from international socialism, Schumacher also attributed election defeats to the pernicious influence that the Catholic Church exerted on voters. And just as Basso had described fascism and Christian Democracy as two sides of the same coin,⁴⁸ the SPD leadership was convinced that its Christian Democratic government was paving the way for a return to authoritarianism or fascism. After the Christian Democrats had won a resounding victory in the September 1953 parliamentary elections, Fritz Heine, a member of the SPD Executive and one of Schumacher’s closest confidants, went as far as to claim that these had probably been the last democratic elections in West Germany.⁴⁹

The French socialists, for their part, were well aware that they had rather more in common with socialists in neighbouring countries than with their British and Scandinavian comrades. Speaking at the July 1953 congress of the SFIO, Mollet insisted that it was “not fair” to compare the SFIO with Labour or the Scandinavian social democratic parties, i.e. “where there is organic unity between the free trade unions

and the party". In fact, "the only [socialist] party in Europe that finds itself in similar conditions to us, which is confronted with a similar communist danger, is the Italian party". Italian socialism certainly did not provide a template for the SFIO, however. Quite the contrary, Mollet urged the party faithful to learn from "the mistakes" the Italian socialists had made: as the PSDI had "lost its revolutionary character" and the PSI was no more than "the stooge and servant of, and the gateway to the Stalinists". Comparisons had "no value", concluded Mollet, and "for party members to draw them amounts to defeatism".⁵⁰

Towards Consensus

At the start of the 1950s, the teachings of the British and Scandinavian models thus carried little that was of relevance to either the German social democrats or the French socialists. What mattered was rather the specific historical and socio-political conditions in which their parties had to operate. As the decade progressed, however, most of continental Europe underwent a profound social and economic transformation. The fateful experiences of the interwar years, moreover, became more distant memories as the years went by. By the end of the decade, therefore, many continental parties were in the process of revisiting or revising their basic programmes.

This prompted a fresh debate on "the position of democratic socialism today" at the July 1959 congress of the Socialist International in Hamburg. Oscar Pollak, the editor of the national SPÖ newspaper and a close ally of the Labour Party ever since he spent the war in Britain, delivered the introductory speech. In it, he explained how the process of "integrating the worker into the state" had varied widely from one country to the next. This was linked, he argued, to the diverse political conditions in which socialist labour movements had come into being across Europe. In countries such as Britain, "where political democracy is older than the labour movement", it had been possible for socialist parties to arise "without hostility to state and nation". As "parliament and the franchise" were already in place, socialists "must merely learn how to use them" to "take over the government of the country". This stood in stark contrast to the historical conditions in countries like Russia, where the labour movement had emerged "in a fierce struggle against an overpowering, autocratic, [and] brutal state". For that reason, socialism in such countries had often taken "the form of a revolutionary conspiracy with strong anarchist tendencies". The countries of Central Europe had found themselves in "an intermediate situation" vis-à-vis these two extremes. In these countries, burgeoning socialist movements had had to "fight for democracy" and "reshape parliament and the franchise". In this way,

a different labour movement had emerged in the different parts of Europe, with wide variation between individual countries.⁵¹

According to Pollak, however, the relationship between the working class and the state had changed fundamentally since the times when “workers [...] were the mere objects of government”. The state, he insisted, “no longer belongs to the bourgeoisie alone”. For the modern state directed the economy, provided social security, and promoted welfare. The working class had thus “become [a] participant in government”, although he conceded that the working class still had to “share the government with other classes”. As a consequence, the modern state was still marred by inequalities and not yet “free from the advantage and privileges that ownership of property [...] confers”. But “the prophecy of Marx and Engels about the ‘withering away of the state’ is completely wrong and totally refuted”.⁵²

In the early 1950s, such heresies of Marxist thought would still have incited a heated debate. This time around, however, most parties seemed to agree that some of their long-held principles and beliefs had not stood the test of time. Speaking for the SFIO, former French Minister of the Interior Jules Moch warmly welcomed Pollak’s words regarding the modern state. In fact, he pointed out that the French socialists would go “even further” than him in questioning core Marxist tenets. The theory that periodic crises were inherent to the capitalist system, for example needed to be “re-examined”. For since the Great Depression, he noted, there had only been “partial recessions” limited to certain industrial branches or geographic areas. Modern capitalism had thus certainly “learned how to control itself”. In the same vein, continued Moch, “we believe that we can no longer speak of the proletarianisation of the masses”. After all, even in the most advanced economies industrial workers barely made up one third of the population and already found themselves outnumbered by those employed in the services sector. It followed, he explained, that socialist parties could not “hope to come to power” unless they found “allies outside the working class”.⁵³

This desire to break free from the electoral ghetto associated with class politics was also manifest in the SPD’s contribution to the debate. Carlo Schmid, member of the SPD Executive and one of the spiritual fathers of the Bad Godesberg programme that the German social democrats would adopt within months of the Hamburg congress, noted that many different impulses led people to become socialists. Some did so out of traditional socio-economic considerations, he explained, others for ethical reasons. But there were also people who chose socialism “on religious grounds”. If this was already a far cry from the overt anti-clericalism that the SPD had espoused at the start of the decade, Schmid also showed remarkable flexibility in broader questions of doctrine. Gone were the calls for the formulation of a universally applicable theoretical framework. Instead, Schmid acknowledged that the

widely divergent conditions in which socialist parties found themselves “inevitably” made for “different ways” towards their common aims. Those objectives, moreover, were narrowly defined around “human dignity” and various liberties. “Freedom from fear, freedom from want, [and] freedom from oppression”, he insisted, “these are the freedoms we consider indispensable”.⁵⁴

The only major European party that sounded a discordant note at Hamburg was the PSDI. According to Balabanoff, who once again represented the Italian social democrats, modern socialism no longer merged theory with praxis. In this respect, she drew a comparison between the generation that had founded the SPD and the current crop of German social democrats. She argued that August Bebel, one of the founding fathers of the SPD, had “never lost sight of the [socialist] ideal” in “dealing with day-to-day problems”. This ability “to combine the practical with the theoretical”, however, was lacking amongst present-day socialist parties. While the municipal social democrats who ran post-war Hamburg had good reason to be proud of “their success in rebuilding their devastated city”, “fascism and war have destroyed more than just buildings, they have destroyed the spirit, the idealism, [and] the solidarity of the masses and this is what we have to rebuild”. After all, in their efforts to achieve piecemeal reforms within existing structures, socialist parties had often come to disregard the ideological dimension to their work. It was up to socialists, insisted Balabanoff, to show people “that economic prosperity and security are not ends in themselves. Instead, [w]e must awaken their socialist conscience”. For in recent years, she lamented, “[w]e have made too many concessions to other parties, [to] other philosophies of life. We are inclined to adjust our way of speaking and thinking [...] to the standards of others”.⁵⁵

What is striking here is not only how strongly the attitudes taken by the PSDI diverged from those of its European sister parties, but also how closely they resembled those of the Italian socialists of the PSI. Having finally broken with the communists after 1956, the PSI had tentatively resumed contact with the international socialist movement. Nevertheless, very significant divides remained. The PSI, for example, immediately denounced the Bad Godesberg programme of the SPD as “a surrender” to reformism.⁵⁶ Indeed, PSI Secretary Pietro Nenni assured the February 1957 PSI congress that he would by no means “hide or minimise” their “profound differences [...] with the European social democratic parties”. These differences were due, he explained, “partly to divergences in doctrine, partly to the different social environment, and [partly] to the diverse historical contexts in which class struggle has taken place [...] in Britain and Scandinavia, in France, in Germany compared to us”.⁵⁷ That different social structures and a different set of historical circumstances made for different roads to socialism was of course what the Italian socialists had argued all along. And when a delegation of the Norwegian DNA

met with the PSI leadership in Rome later in 1957, it came to a similar conclusion. “They talk about Marxism and class struggle like we used to do thirty years ago”, noted its report, “perhaps that is because their socio-economic situation resembles that of ours back then”.⁵⁸

Conclusion

With such enormous differences in socio-economic conditions, and in political cultures, persisting more than a decade after the liberation, it is certainly anachronistic to apply the British or Scandinavian models to Italian socialism. In fact, out of the three determinants that Nenni mentioned – doctrines, society, and history – the post-war socialists and social democrats could of course influence only one. And those continental parties that decided to change their doctrines did not necessarily fare better for it. While the SPÖ, which by and large abandoned (Austro-) Marxism following the war, was the only continental party to consistently poll above 40 per cent of the vote, its vote share, in a much narrower field, did not rise markedly compared to its interwar level. In any case, the post-war Austrian socialists, in perennial coalition with the equally strong Catholics, could never dominate governments in the way that their Scandinavian counterparts did. The Dutch PvdA, meanwhile, explicitly modelled itself on the Labour Party in its bid to attract Christian voters. Yet, its dream of an electoral “breakthrough” of the kind that Labour had achieved in 1945 ran up against the continued “pillarization” of Dutch society, which made it very difficult to wean Catholic and Protestant voters from their respective pillars. As a consequence, the post-war Dutch social democrats remained stuck at around 30 per cent of the popular vote, thus never truly managing to outperform their strongly anti-clerical German comrades. All of this goes to show that the teachings of the British or Scandinavian roads to socialism, still very much the focal point for academic accounts of post-war European socialism, could not readily be exported to continental countries with completely different social structures and political histories.

This forces us to reconsider our approach to the history of the post-war European socialist and social democratic parties. For much of the scholarly work that has been published to date has explored post-war European socialism through an ideological prism, with a strong focus on doctrines, theories, and programmes. What this article has demonstrated is that ideology mattered far less to the success of the post-war socialist parties than a set of material and historical circumstances. That means that historians have devoted rather too much attention to the theoretical

debates within and between the European socialist parties and not nearly enough to the social, economic, and political arguments with which the various parties actually underpinned their positions during these debates. In fact, as we have seen, even those parties that kept invoking scientific Marxism in the post-war era often took a pick-and-choose approach towards the Marxist theoretical framework. After the expulsion of the Eastern European parties and the PSI, none of the parties of the international socialist movement would still commit themselves to the establishment of a “dictatorship of the proletariat” – indeed, what the French socialists and Italian social democrats billed as “the Marxist method” included basic redistributionist policies within the framework of a capitalist economy. Far from serving as some sort of holy script for the socialist parties from the three largest countries on the European mainland, theoretical Marxism was therefore often made to fit with national traditions and preoccupations.

If we substitute the idealist and teleological perspective that has thus far characterised the historiography of post-war European socialism for an approach that is rooted in social and political history, we can divide the post-war European socialist movement into three rough groups – along the lines that Pollak sketched at the Hamburg congress of the Socialist International. The first group, comprising the British and Scandinavian parties, operated in modern industrial societies with deep-rooted democratic traditions. The second, which included most parties on the European mainland, found themselves in societies that were moving in the same direction, but were still more divided along political and religious lines. The third group, consisting of the PSI and the Eastern European parties, were faced with backward rural societies that had never truly known democracy. By revisiting post-war European socialism through the prism of this trichotomy, we can uncover similarities and differences that remain obscured in studies taking the British and/or Scandinavian experiences as their (exclusive) point of departure. Such studies, for example, often lump together the post-war histories of the SFIO and the PSI as two parties that had willingly turned their backs on the modern age⁵⁹ – thereby overlooking the obvious and outspoken differences between their approaches. At the same time, we have seen how even some of the continental parties that outwardly followed the British or Scandinavian templates used exactly the kind of arguments that the PSI and Eastern European parties had always drawn on to explain away their electoral setbacks. Hence it is only by recalibrating our focus from the North and the West to the South and the East that we can begin to make sense of the attitudes of those continental socialist and social democratic parties that spent the golden age on the sidelines.

Notes

- 1 Parti Socialiste – SFIO, Conseil national des 10 et 11 janvier 1959, Puteaux, Fondation Jean Jaurès, Paris (FJJ), <http://62.210.214.184/cg-ps/documents/pdf/cons-1959-01-10.pdf> (19 June 2017). All translations from non-English sources in this article are mine.
- 2 On the Labour Party's role in the Labour and Socialist International after 1933, see: Christine Collette, *The International Faith: Labour's Attitudes to European Socialism, 1918–1939*, Aldershot 1998, 76–98.
- 3 Francis Sejersted, *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton 2011, 159–172.
- 4 For a brief summary of the 'golden age', see: Ben Jackson, Social Democracy, in: Michael Freeden/Lyman Tower Sargent/Marc Stears, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford 2013, 348–363, 352–357.
- 5 See Kenneth O. Morgan, *Labour in Power 1945–1951*, Oxford 1984, 142–187.
- 6 Mary Hilson, *The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945*, London 2008, ch. 2.
- 7 Martin Francis, *Ideas and Policies Under Labour, 1945–1951: Building a New Britain*, Manchester/New York 1997, 14–18.
- 8 Marcel van der Linden, *Metamorphoses of European Social Democracy*, in: *Socialism and Democracy* 12/1 (1998), 161–186, 167.
- 9 Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century*, New York 2006, 188–196.
- 10 Dietrich Orlow, *Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945–1969*, Oxford/New York 2000, 3, 272–276.
- 11 Bernd Faulenbach, *Geschichte der SPD: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich 2012, 46–47.
- 12 This was the famous slogan that the West German Christian democrats used to attack the SPD in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of September 1953.
- 13 On the long road that the SPD had to travel before becoming a proper "people's party" see: Peter Lösche/Frank Walter, *Die SPD, Klassenpartei, Volkspartei, Quotenpartei: Zur Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie von Weimar bis zur deutschen Vereinigung*, Darmstadt 1992.
- 14 Alain Bergounioux/Gérard Grunberg, *L'ambition et les remords: Les socialistes français et le pouvoir (1905–2005)*, Paris 2006, 168–169.
- 15 On the many debates in the post-war SFIO, see the essays in: Serge Berstein et al., *Le Parti socialiste entre Résistance et République*, Paris 2000.
- 16 Luciano Cafagna, *Una strana disfatta: La parabola dell'autonomismo socialista*, Venice 1996; Giovanni Sabbatucci, *Il riformismo impossibile: Storia del socialismo italiano*, Rome 1991.
- 17 Stefan Berger, *Communism, Social Democracy and the Democracy Gap*, Paper presented at the conference "The International Labour Movement at the Threshold of Two Centuries", Stockholm 2002, http://www.arbark.se/pdf_wrd/berger_int.pdf (22 June 2017).
- 18 Orlow, *Common Destiny*, 141.
- 19 Rolf Steininger, *Deutschland und die Sozialistische Internationale nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Bonn 1979, 83.
- 20 See especially: Peter Heumos, *Europäischer Sozialismus im Kalten Krieg: Briefe und Berichte 1944–1948*, Frankfurt am Main 2004, 13–46.
- 21 See my comparative history of the post-war Czechoslovak, French, Italian, and Polish socialist and social democratic parties: Jan De Graaf, *Socialism Across the Iron Curtain: Socialist Parties in East and West and the Reconstruction of Europe after 1945*, Cambridge 2019.
- 22 Fritz Weber, *Der Kalte Krieg in der SPÖ: Koalitionswächter, Pragmatiker und revolutionäre Sozialisten*, Vienna 1986, 37; Dieter A. Binder, "Rescuing the Christian Occident" and "Europe in US": The People's Party in Austria, in: Michael Gehler/Wolfram Kaiser, eds., *Christian Democracy in Europe Since 1945*, Volume 2, London/New York 2004, 139–154, 139.
- 23 One famous PvdA election poster, used during the campaign for the May 1946 parliamentary elections, depicted a British serviceman and called on voters to "do what Tommy did: he voted Labour. The Dutch should vote for the Partij van de Arbeid".

- 24 Jean-Jacques Becker, *La gauche à la Libération*, in: Jean-Jacques Becker/Gilles Candar, eds., *Histoire des gauches en France*, Vol. 2: XXe siècle: à l'épreuve de l'histoire, Paris 2004, 400–415, 403–404.
- 25 Quoted in: Julius Braunthal, *Geschichte der Internationale*, Volume III, Hannover 1971, 170–171.
- 26 *Intervento al Consiglio Nazionale del Partito Socialista* [July–August 1946]. Quoted in: Stefano Caretti, ed., *Sandro Pertini. Dal delitto Matteotti alla Costituente. Scritti e discorsi: 1924–1946*, Manduria 2008, 149.
- 27 Lelio Basso, *Socialismo Europeo*, in: *Quarto Stato*, 15 September 1946, <http://leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=cf99e9daef3d5143ea3b0399083d2f01> (June 2017).
- 28 *International Socialist Conference at Clacton*, 17–20 May 1946, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester (LHASC), Labour Party Archive (LPA), International Department, Box 3.
- 29 *Protokół posiedzenia CKW PPS* [14 June 1946], Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw (AAN), Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS), Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy (CKW), 235/III/2, fo. 58.
- 30 *International Socialist Conference at Clacton*, 17–20 May 1946, LHASC, LPA, International Department, Box 3.
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 Indeed, this had led various European socialist parties to still oppose the introduction of female suffrage during the interwar period. See: Helmut Gruber/Pamela Graves, eds., *Women and Socialism – Socialism and Women: Europe Between the World Wars*, New York/Oxford 1998, 10.
- 33 Lelio Basso, *Per una coscienza democratica*, in: *Avanti!*, 29 August 1945, <http://leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=1fb14f1db3eb10586206df1cbf448089> (3 July 2017).
- 34 *International Socialist Conference at Clacton*, 17–20 May 1946, LHASC, LPA, International Department, Box 3.
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *Report of the International Socialist Conference at Copenhagen*, 1–3 June 1950, Institut Emile Vandervelde, Brussels (IEV), *Fonds Iie Internationale, III 1. Conférences Socialistes Internationales*.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 Whereas the Swedish report had recognized that the SAP had been “decisively influenced by Marxist thinking” in its early days, it immediately added that its interpretation of Marxism had been “reformist” since the beginning of the twentieth century. This reformist approach, the report went on to explain, included a commitment to work within the capitalist system and reject notions of class struggle. See: *The Basis of Democratic Socialism*. Prepared by the Swedish Social Democratic Party, IEV, *Fonds Iie Internationale, III 1. Conférences Socialistes Internationales*.
- 39 *Report of the International Socialist Conference at Copenhagen*, 1–3 June 1950, IEV, *Fonds Iie Internationale, III 1. Conférences Socialistes Internationales*.
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 *Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism*, <http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=39> (7 July 2017).
- 44 *Report of the First Congress of the Socialist International*, IEV, *Fonds Iie Internationale, III. 2 Ier congres de l'I.S., Francfort, 30-06–3-07-1951*.
- 45 *Ibid.* Emphasis in original.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 Lelio Basso, *Due totalitarismi, fascismo e democrazia cristiana*, Milan 1951.
- 49 Dietrich Orlow, *Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and the SPD, 1945–1966*, in: *German Studies Review* 16/1 (1993), 77–102, 88.
- 50 *Parti Socialiste SFIO – Congrès national des 2, 3, 4 et 5 juillet 1953*, FJJ, <http://62.210.214.184/cg-ps/documents/pdf/cong-1953-07-02.pdf> (9 July 2017).
- 51 *Report of the Sixth Congress of the Socialist International*, IEV, *Iie Internationale, III. 7 VIe congrès, Hambourg 14–17-07-1959*.
- 52 *Ibid.*
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 *Ibid.*

- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Francesca Traldi, *Il Psi di fronte a Bad Godesberg*, in: *Ventesimo secolo 18/8* (2009), 137–161.
- 57 Fondazione di Studi Storici Filippo Turati, Florence, Fondo Partito socialista italiano (Psi) – Direzione nazionale, Serie 20: Congressi nazionali e internazionali, Sottoserie 1: Congressi nazionali, XXXII Congresso nazionale, 58 “Seduta di 6 febbraio 1957”, fo. 113.
- 58 Quoted in: Giovanni Scirocco, *Politique d’abord: Il Psi, la Guerra Fredda e la politica internazionale, 1948–1957*, Milan 2010, 264.
- 59 See e.g. Berman, *The Primacy of Politics, 192–195*; John T. Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, Manchester/New York 2000, 18.